The Institutional Basis of Gender Inequality: The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) by Branisa, Boris et al.
THE INSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF GENDERINEQUALITY:  
THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONSAND GENDER INDEX (SIGI) 
Boris Branisa, Stephan Klasen, Maria Ziegler, Denis Drechsler and Johannes 
Jütting 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses variables from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Gender, Institutions, and Development (GID) database to 
construct the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) and its subindices Family 
code, Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference, and Ownership rights. 
Instead of measuring gender inequality in outcomes, SIGI and its subindices  
measure long-lasting social institutions defined as societal practices and legal norms 
that frame gender roles. The SIGI combines them into a multidimensional index of 
women’s deprivation caused by gendered social institutions. Inspired by the Foster–
Greer–Thorbecke poverty measures, the SIGI offers a new way of aggregating 
gender inequality by penalizing high inequality in each dimension and allowing only 
partial compensation between indices. The indices identify countries and dimensions 
of gendered social institutions that deserve attention. Empirical results confirm that 
the SIGI  complement other gender-related indices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite considerable progress in recent decades, gender inequality in many 
dimensions of well-being remains pervasive in many developing countries. This is an 
intrinsic issue of equity as the affected women are deprived of their basic freedoms 
(AmartyaSen 1999). But going beyond this intrinsic feature of gender inequality, 
there is considerable evidence that these discrepancies have high costs for society in 
the form of lower human capital, worse governance, and lower growth (for 
example,World Bank 2001, 2011;Ray Rees and Ray Riezman2012; Stephan Klasen 
2002; Stephan Klasen and Francesca Lamanna 2009). The intrinsic and instrumental 
value of gender equality has been recognized and incorporated in the development 
agenda, for example in Millennium Development Goal 3:Promote Gender Equality 
and Empower Womeni, as well as the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women. 
To measure the extent of gender inequality across countries several gender-
related indices have been proposed. They include but are not limited to three 
measures from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): the Gender-
Related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) 
(UNDP 1995) and the recently published Gender Inequality Index (GII) (UNDP 
2010), the Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum (Augusto 
Lopez-Claros and Saadia Zahidi 2005), and the Gender Equity Index developed by 
Social Watch (2005) or the African Gender Status Index proposed by the Economic 
Commission for Africa (2004). These measures focus on gender inequality in well-
being or in agency, and they are typically outcome-focused, usually considering gaps 
in education, health and survival, employment, and political participation. They show 
that there is a great heterogeneity in levels and trends of such outcome-based 
measures of gender-inequality as well as in gender gaps in agency.ii 
 While these gender inequality measures have clearly contributed to research 
and policy in this important field, focusing only on these outcomes neglects the 
question of the origins of these inequalities. Gender inequality is the result of human 
behavior, and institutions influence how people behave and interact. Thus to 
understand gender inequality beyond outcomes, one needs to study the institutional 
basis of gender inequality. These institutions include formal institutions such as laws 
and codes of conduct as well as informal institutions such as norms and values that 
guide and constrain behavior. From an economics perspective, institutions are the 
result of collective choices in a society to achieve efficiency, solve collective action 
dilemmas, and reduce transaction costs (Douglass North1990). Other social sciences 
emphasize legitimacy and appropriateness instead of efficiency. Institutions 
influence the preferences of actors and provide role models that are internalized by 
them (Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor 1996; Indra De Soysa and Johannes Jütting 
2007). 
In the literature, the only other composite index that is closer to our intention 
here are the gender-specific human rights measures of the CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project.iii They include the Women's Political Rights index (WOPOL) that focuses on 
the right of women to vote, petition, and be elected; the Women's Economic Rights 
index (WECON) that focuses on women’s equal rights in the labor market; and the 
Women's Social Rights index (WOSOC), which focuses on rights in the social 
sphere (marriage, inheritance, travel, education, etc.). These indices measure on a 
yearly basis whether a number of internationally recognized rights for women are 
included in law and whether government enforces them. From the three indices, 
WOSOC is the most encompassing measure covering social relations and most 
closely related to our approach (Christian Bjornskov, Axel Dreher, and Justina 
Fischer 2007). Any of these three indices could be used as a partial proxy for 
institutions; however, this solution is not without problems as they also cover 
outcomes of institutions. Moreover, these indices focus on laws and rights (and their 
enforcement), and therefore neglect more informal institutions that persist in 
societies. Also, they do not differentiate between what happens within the family and 
what happens in public and social life. Furthermore, all three indices can only take 
four values from zero (no rights) to three (legally guaranteed and enforced rights), 
thus making it difficult to compare and rank countries as many results only indicate a 
tie in the data. 
Given the lack of measures capturing the institutional basis of gender 
inequality that go beyond laws and rights, this paper proposes a new measure of 
social institutions related to gender inequality, and a related composite index called 
the Social Institutions and Gender INdex (SIGI).iv Social institutions related to 
gender inequality are long-lastingnorms, values, and codes of conduct that find 
expression in traditions, customs and cultural practices, and informal and formal 
laws. They influence human behavior as they frame gender-relevant meanings, form 
the basis of gender roles, and become guiding principles in everyday life. Influencing 
the distribution of power between men and women in the private sphere of the 
heterosexual family, in the economic sphere, and in public life, they constrain the 
opportunities of men and women and their capabilities to live the life they value (Sen 
1999). Measuring and understanding these social institutions is necessary to explain 
gender inequality in outcomes and the deprivation that women experience. 
The proposed indicators proxy social institutions related to gender inequality 
in non-OECD countries based on variables of the OECD Gender, Institutions and 
Development database (Christian Morrisson and Johannes Jütting 2005; Johannes 
Jütting, Christian Morrisson, Jeff Dayton-Johnson, and Denis Drechsler 2008). These 
variables measure particularly extreme forms of inequalities in social institutions 
relating to gender. Using polychoric principal component analysis, we aggregate 
these variables into five subindices that each measure one dimension of social 
institutions related to gender inequality: Family code, Civil liberties, Physical 
integrity, Son preference, and Ownership rights. Then, we combine the subindices 
into the SIGI as a multidimensional measure of deprivation of women. The formula 
of the SIGI is inspired by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke poverty measures (FGT; 
James Foster, Joel Greer and Erik Thorbecke 1984) and offers a new way of 
aggregating gender inequality in several dimensions measured by the subindices. It is 
transparent and easy to understand; it penalizes high inequality in each dimension 
and allows only for partial compensation of gaps between dimensions. 
The SIGI and the subindices are useful tools to compare the societal situation 
of women in over 100 non-OECD countries from a new perspective, allowing the 
identification of countries and dimensions of social institutions that deserve 
policymakers’ attention and need to be scrutinized in detail. The SIGI presents a 
different approach to the measurement of gender inequality by focusing on the 
institutional drivers of gender inequality, and our empirical results show that the 
SIGI provides additional information to that of other well-known gender-related 
indices. Regression analysis shows that the SIGI provides new insights into gender-
specific outcomes, even if one controls for region, religion, and level of economic 
development.v 
 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDICES 
Building reliable, useful, and internationally comparable indices is generally a tough 
challenge. In the field of gender analysis, particular problems relate to the lack of 
gender-disaggregated statistics and the need for more careful interpretation of 
dimensions where men and women differ for biological reasons (for example: how to 
interpret indicators of fertility or reproductive health in gender gap analyses).vi And 
institutions often pose particular challenges, as they cannot often be assessed well in 
quantitative terms. As a result, any index that attempts to capture gender inequality in 
social institutions across the world will invariably run up against conceptual and data 
constraints. For many items, the data are either not available, reliable, or comparable 
and sometimes the data are hard to interpret. As a result, difficult compromises have 
to be made when choosing indicators and scoring them; data availability, coverage, 
and statistical validity often assume as much importance as conceptual superiority of 
a particular indicator or scoring approach. It is important, however, to advance this 
research agenda by putting together data and indicators even in these hard-to-
measure dimensions of gender inequality, even if the resulting index can only be 
seen as a starting point for a more ambitious data gathering and research agenda. 
The SIGI is a multidimensional composite index that reflects the deprivation 
of women caused by social institutions related to gender inequality. The SIGI is 
composed of five dimensions that are measured by five subindices, Family code, 
Civil liberties, Physical integrity, Son preference and Ownership rights.These 
dimensions were chosen as each represents an important yet distinct aspect of a 
gender-based institution (see below). 
The subindices are built out of variables from the OECD Development 
Centre's GID Database (Morrisson and Jütting 2005;Jütting et al.2008). This is a 
cross-country database covering about 120 non-OECD countries with more than 
twenty variables measuring social institutions related to gender inequality.vii These 
variables proxy social institutions through prevalence rates, legal indicators, or 
indicators of social practices and are all coded from 0 to 1.viii The value 0 means no 
or very low inequality and the value 1 indicates high inequality. The choice of the 
variables used for the construction of the social institutions indicators is guided by 
the informational content they provide, their relevance for a comprehensive measure 
of social institutions related to gender, and their coverage so that as many countries 
as possible can be ranked. 
 
The subindices 
 
The subindices each measure one dimension of social institutions related to gender 
inequality. Before combining the variables to the respective subindex, we have 
checked whether these variables measure the same underlying concept estimating the 
statistical association between them. Then, the variables are combined into a one-
dimensional subindex using the method of polychoric principal component analysis 
(Stanislav Kolenikov and Gustavo Angeles 2009) to extract the common information 
of the variables.ix We use the first principal component as a proxy for the common 
information contained by the variables corresponding to the subindices..x The weight 
that each variable gets in these linear combinations is obtained by analyzing the 
correlation structure in the data. As in the case of the variables, the subindices and 
the SIGI range from 0 to 1 with 0 corresponding to no inequality and the value 1 to 
complete inequality. 
 The precise variable lists and coding guidelines are presented in the on-ling 
appendix and will only be summarized here. The Family code dimension refers to 
the private sphere with institutions that influence the decision-making power of 
women in the household. Family code is measured by the variables Parental 
authority of women during marriage and after divorce , Inheritance rights, the 
prevalence of Early marriage among teenage girls  and the acceptance or legality of 
Polygamy.xi 
The Civil liberties dimension captures the social sphere by measuring the 
freedom of social participation of women, an important pre-condition for their 
opportunities to participate on an equal footing in public and economic life. It 
includes the variables Freedom of movement of women outside their own household, 
and Freedom of dress measuring the requirement to follow a dress code with leavin 
the house. 
The Physical integrity dimension comprises two indicators on violence 
against women, which measures the institutional basis of women's control over their 
own bodies. The variable violence against women measures existence of laws against 
domestic violence, sexual assault or rape, and sexual harassment and Female genital 
mutilation measures the prevalence of the practice 
 The dimension Son preference measures a manifestation of son preference 
under scarce resources; it encapsulates social institutions (relating to marriage 
practices, locality of sons and daughters after marriage, and old-age arrangements) 
that lead parents to prefer sons to daughters as offspring (Stephan Klasen and 
Claudia Wink 2003). It includes the variable Missing women which measures the 
share of females that have suffered from gender bias in mortality or pre-birth sex 
selection..xii 
The Ownership rights dimension covers the economic sphere of social 
institutions proxied by the access of women to several types of property with three 
variables referring to access to land, credit, and property other than land, 
respectively.xiii 
See Table 1 in the online appendixfor the coding guidelines of all variables. 
The coding was done by experts using coding manuals, and the actual coding was 
undertaken by the OECD Development Center as part of the construction of the GID 
database.While we believe that these indicators and dimensions capture essential 
elements of social institutions affecting gender inequality, there are clearly some 
notable limitations. First, some indicators only partially capture the dimension we 
would like to capture. For example, the violence against women indicator is based on 
laws only, as comparable data on actual prevalence were not available; similarly, 
freedom of dress only captures one particular aspect of women's obligations and 
restrictions when leaving the home. Second, in some dimensions one could think of 
additional indicators that could capture the inequality in social institutions better. For 
example, the Physical integritysubindex does not include any indicators related to 
social institutions associated with reproduction. We experiment below with an 
indicator of abortion rights as one possible dimension and report below on how this 
would change the results. Similarly, one could think of expanding the Ownership 
rights dimension by including more specifically rights and institutions in the labor 
market; the Son preference dimension could also include indicators of fertility 
preference. In both cases, data limitations prevented an extension. Fourth, the scoring 
is often based on subjective interpretation of available information and can therefore 
be subject to criticism. Lastly, one may wonder why there are no measures of 
women's political rights and participation included. This was based on the decision 
that the measure is meant to focus on social institutions and thus not explicitly 
consider formal political institutions. Clearly this is another area where one can 
reasonably disagree. 
Thus we want to emphasize that our proposed measure could still be 
improved if better data on some of the dimensions of social institutions were 
available. We do, however, see our indicators and the composite index as a good 
starting point for furthering this important research agenda. 
 
The SIGI 
Based on the indicators and subindices discussed above, the SIGI is then an 
unweighted average of a non-linear function of the subindices. We use equal weights 
for the subindices, as we see no reason for valuing one of the dimensions more or 
less than the others. The non-linear function arises because we assume that inequality 
in gender-related social institutions leads to deprivation experienced by affected 
women, and that deprivation increases more than proportionally when inequality 
increases. Thus, high inequality is penalized in every dimension. The non-linearity 
also means that the SIGI does not allow for total compensation of inequality among 
subindices, but permits only partial compensation. Partial compensation implies that 
high inequality in one dimension, that is one subindex, can only be partially 
compensated with low inequality on another dimension. 
For our specific five subindices, the value of the index the SIGI is then 
calculated as follows: 
SIGI = 1/5 (SubindexFamily code)² + 1/5 (SubindexCivil liberties)² 
 + 1/5 (SubindexPhysical integrity)² + 1/5 (SubindexSon preference)² 
 + 1/5 (SubindexOwnership rights)² (1) 
 
Using a more general notation, the formula for the SIGI I(X), where X is the vector 
containing the values of the subindicesxi with i= 1, ...,n, is derived from the following 
considerations. For any subindexxi, we interpret the value 0 as the goal of no 
inequality to be achieved in every dimension. We define a deprivation function (xi, 
0), with f(xi,0)>0 if xi> 0 and f(xi, 0) = 0 if xi= 0 (for example, 
SreenivasanSubramanian 2007). Higher values of xi should lead to a penalization in 
I(X) that should increase with the distance xi to zero. In our case the deprivation 
function is the square of the distance to 0 so that deprivation increases more than 
proportionally as inequality increases. 
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where Y is the vector containing all incomes, yi with i= 1, ...,n is the income of 
individuali, z is the poverty line, andα>0 is a penalization parameter. 
 To compute the SIGI, the value 2 is chosen for a as the square function has 
the advantage of easy interpretation. With α= 2 the transfer principle is satisfied 
(FGT 1984). In the case of the SIGI, the transfer principle means that, starting from a 
situation of equal score in two dimensions, an increase in score (that is, higher 
inequality) in one dimension and an equal-sized decrease of the score in the other 
dimension (that is, lower inequality) will raise the SIGI, thereby signalling higher 
overall gender inequality.xiv 
 To highlight the effects of partial compensation as compared to total 
compensation, we computed the statistical association between the SIGI and a simple 
arithmetic average of the five subindices that allows for total compensation and 
compared the country rankings of both measures. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the SIGI and the simple arithmetic average of the five subindices shows a 
very high and statistically significant correlation between both measures (Table 1). 
However, when we compare the ranks of the SIGI with those obtained using a simple 
arithmetic average of the five subindices in Table 2  in the online appendix, we 
observe that there are noticeable differences in the rankings of the 102 included 
countries. Examples are China and Nepal. China ranks in position 55 using the 
simple average, but worsens to place 83 in the SIGI ranking. Nepal has place 84 
considering the simple average, and improves to rank 65 using the SIGI. For China, 
this is due to the high inequality on the subindex Son preference, which in the SIGI 
case cannot be fully compensated with relatively low values for the other subindices. 
For Nepal, we observe the opposite case as all subindices have values reflecting 
moderate inequality. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Country rankings and regional patterns 
In Table 2 the results for the SIGI and its five subindices are presented. Among the 
102 developing countries considered by the SIGI,xv Paraguay, Croatia, Kazakhstan, 
Argentina, and Costa Rica have the lowest levels of gender inequality related to 
social institutions. Sudan is the country that occupies the last position, followed by 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Yemen, which means that gender inequality in 
social institutions is a major problem there. As can be seen by studying the 
subindices, most of the top third of performers have no inequality in the Civil 
liberties, no evidence for Son preference, and no inequality in Ownership rights. 
Therefore for these countries, the final ranking is heavily influenced by performance 
in Family code and Physical integrity where (nearly) all countries show some 
inequalities. Particularly the acceptance of violence against women plays a rather 
important role here. At the bottom end of the table, countries generally perform very 
poorly in the Family code, Physical integrity, and Ownership rights. There is, 
however, great heterogeneity in the Civil liberties and Son preference indicator 
where some countries at the bottom of the table are also scoring well. 
In the subindex Family code, best performers are China, Jamaica, Croatia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan while Worst performers are Mali, Chad, Afghanistan, 
Mozambique and Zambia. In the dimension.Civil liberties,the top 2/3 of countries 
report no inequalities in these forms of gender inequality. Sudan, Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iran occupy the last five positions of high inequality. In the 
subindex Physical integrity. Hong Kong, Bangladesh, Taiwan, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Paraguay, and Philippines are at the top of the ranking while Mali, Somalia, Sudan, 
Egypt, and Sierra Leone are at the bottom. In the dimension Son preference, 2/3 of 
countries report no inequality; the countries that rank worst are China, Afghanistan, 
Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, India, and Bhutan; for them, poor performance in this 
indicator has a sizable influence on their ranking in the overall SIGI. Finally, in the 
subindex Ownership rights. 42 countries share position 1 as they have no inequality 
in this dimension. On the other hand the four worst performing countries are Sudan, 
Sierra Leone, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus it is noticeable 
that, despite some correlation of performance across subindices, there is a great deal 
of heterogeneity in country performance across indicators, which further justifies 
only allowing partial compensation across dimensions. China is most extreme here 
as it is ranked best in three dimensions (Family code, Civil liberties, and Ownership 
rights), while it performs abysmally on Son preference and also rather poorly on 
Physical integrity. Similarly, there are a number of Sub-Saharan African countries 
who score perfectly on Son preference and Civil liberties, but very poorly on the 
other three, leading to poor rankings overall. Conversely, the countries that are most 
balanced in their (generally poor) performance across dimensions are from South 
Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, although there some individual country 
exceptions. 
To find out whether apparent regional patterns in social institutions related to 
gender inequality are systematic, we divide the countries in quintiles following the 
scores of the SIGI and its subindices (Table 3). The first quintile includes countries 
with lowest inequality and the fifth quintile countries with highest in equality. The 
SIGI does not rank any country in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) or Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) in the two quintiles that reflect the highest inequality in 
social institutions related to gender. In contrast, most countries in South Asia (SA), 
Sub-SaharanAfrica (SSA), and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) rank in these 
two quintiles. Despite this, it is interesting to note that two countries from these 
regions rank in the first (i.e. best) two quintiles. These are Mauritius (SSA) and 
Tunisia (MENA). East Asia and Pacific (EAP) has countries in all five quintiles with 
Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the best quintile and China in 
the worst quintile. The latter result is heavily influenced by China being the worst 
performer in the Son preference dimension (Klasen and Wink 2003). 
Examining the subindices, the patterns are overall similar to the one of the 
SIGI and are briefly summarized:  
• Family code: No country in ECA, LAC, or EAP shows high inequality in this 
dimension. SA, MENA, and SSA remain problematic with most countries having 
social institutions related to high gender inequality. Exceptions are Bhutan in SA, 
Mauritius in SSA, and Tunisia and Israel in MENA.  
• Civil liberties: Only three groups of countries using the quintile analysis can 
be generated with the first group including the first three quintiles. In SSA over one-
half of the countries are now in the first group. Also in MENA there are some 
countries with good scores (Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia). No country in SA is found 
in the first three quintiles of low and moderate inequality.  
• Physical integrity: Most problematic regions are SSA and MENA. 
Exceptions inthese regions are Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa, and Tanzania 
(SSA), and Morocco and Tunisia (MENA).  
• Son preference: Again only three groups of countries can be built by quintile 
analysis, with the first group including the first three quintiles. As in the case of Civil 
liberties most of the countries in SSA do not show problems. Missing women is 
mainly an issue in SA and MENA plus in China. But in both regions there are 
countries that rank in the first group. These are Sri Lanka in SA, and Israel, Lebanon, 
and Occupied Palestinian Territory in MENA. 
• Ownership rights: Most problematic regions are SA, SSA, and MENA. 
Nevertheless, there are cases in these regions that rank in the first quintile. These are 
Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, and Tunisia (MENA), Bhutan (SA), and Eritrea and Mauritius 
(SSA).  
 While these rankings for the SIGI and its subindices generate interesting 
results for the prevalence and country distribution of social institutions related to 
gender inequality, one may wonder to what extent these are driven by data 
limitations, choice of indicators, and dimensions. In particular, we discuss briefly 
three topics related to the selection of variables and country sample. The first one is 
that it could be argued that some of the indicators we are using here are mostly 
relevant to a given region, for example: Son preference in South Asia, female genital 
mutilation in Sub Saharan Africa, or freedom of dress as an issue for countries with 
Muslim populations. We investigated this issue in some detail.xvi First, none of the 
subindices or the individual indicators has a perfect regional correlation in the sense 
that an indicator inequality only occurs in one region. Son preference is an issue 
affecting all regions, and female genital mutilation is an issue in five of the six 
regions. Of course, different regions are affected to different degrees, but that is 
precisely one of the issues this research would hope to uncover. Second, even the 
converse is (mostly) true, namely that there are hardly any subindices and indicators 
where an individual region is entirely unaffected in the sense of having perfect 
equality. The exceptions are that Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean score perfectly on the Civil libertiessubindex (and, by implication, on 
the indicators freedom of movement and dress); and that in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, there is no issue of female genital mutilation. All other indicators and 
subindices show some inequality in all regions. Third, there is substantial within-
region heterogeneity in all indicators and subindices.xvii Lastly, we consider the issue 
of freedom of dress, an issue that typically affects countries with a significant 
Muslim population. Even if freedom of dress is mainly an issue for countries with a 
Muslim majority, the correlation between religion and this variable, which arguably 
would indicate a social institution that makes it more difficult for women to 
participate in public life, is not automatic. However, of the forty-one Muslim 
majority countries, in nineteen there is a perfect score on the Civil liberties indicator 
(meaning no inequality), while only four countries rank highest for this 
inequality.xviii 
As discussed above, one might have considered additional indicators to 
include in the subindices. For most, data availability was a constraint. We will now 
briefly discuss the impact of including one additional variable – the legality of 
abortion – when we have complete data for this factor available. The legality of 
abortion variable could arguably be included in the Physical integrity subindex. 
United Nations (2007) provides information on the legal availability of abortion by 
countries, classifying seven legal reasons for abortion, ranging from "to save the life 
of the woman" to "available upon request." Based on the approach taken by David 
Bloom, David Canning, GüntherFink, and Jocelyn Finlay (2009) we use the seven 
categories to equidistantly code the variable (with “available on request” receiving a 
score of 0 and “not allowed under any circumstances” a score of 1). 
As a robustness exercise, we consider a reformulated SIGI using the same 
methods but including the abortion rights indicator (scored as just described) as an 
additional variable in the Physical integrity subindex. The results for the countries 
for which we can compute both the SIGI and the reformulated SIGI are shown in 
Table 4 in the appendix. Since many Latin American countries have, presumably 
related to their Catholic heritage, more restrictive abortion policies while many ECA 
countries, largely due to their socialist heritage, have particularly liberal policies, so 
including this indicator changes the Physical integrity rankings at the top of the SIGI 
league table. In particular, Croatia now tops the list and 7 ECA countries are among 
the top 10. Only Argentina and Cuba remain in the top ten while Paraguay, El 
Salvador, and Ecuador rank a bit lower. But the change in rankings is based on rather 
small changes in the overall SIGI, and it only has a noticeable impact on rankings of 
countries in these two regions. At the bottom of the rankings, there are few changes. 
While these are useful results, we decided ultimately not to include the 
abortion rights indicator in the final index for the following two reasons. First, there 
is the question of the extent to which restrictions on abortions can be seen as gender 
inequality in Physical integrity. While one may agree that abortion restrictions in 
instances of rape, incest, or when the mother’s life or health are endangered are 
legitimate issues of gender inequality in Physical integrity, it is more controversial 
whether restrictions related to socioeconomic reasons or the health of the fetus are 
issues of gender inequality in Physical integrity.It is also unclear how to 
quantitatively treat the different restrictions in the variable scoring. Second, there are 
also limitations to the data available. As noted in the UN source for the data, in a 
number of countries where abortions is not legal under any circumstances, it is not 
clear whether de facto a defence of necessity be allowed  to justify an abortion" 
(2007) thus it is unclear whether a score of 1 in these cases is actually justified. 
Lastly, we want to discuss the issue that the SIGI is produced only for non-
OECD countries which requires some further discussion. The main problem is that 
our indicators are not appropriate for an accurate assessment of social institutions 
related to gender inequality in OECD countries. Using our indicators, the vast 
majority of OECD member countries (with the exception of Turkey, Mexico, and 
South Korea) would get a perfect score in the SIGI. This is partly due to the fact that 
legal discrimination that governs women's economic, social, and public life is largely 
absent in OECD countries; it is partly also due to the indicators that we use. For 
example, violence against women continues to be a problem afflicting OECD 
countries, but our proxy, as discussed above, does not pick up the prevalence (only 
the legality of it), which again gives all OECD countries a perfect score. Therefore 
by not including OECD countries we avoid the misleading impression that there are 
no remaining inequalities in social institutions that affect OECD countries. One way 
out could be to produce a different SIGI using different indicators for OECD 
countries, as similarly done with the two version of UNDP's Human Poverty Index 
(UNDP 1996), or to extend the SIGI to include more dimensions that have greater 
relevance for OECD countries. Both options are fruitful avenues to pursue this matter 
further. 
 
Simple correlation with other gender-related indices 
The SIGI seeks to understand gender inequality in a new way by focusing on gender 
gaps in social institutions that influence the basic functioning of society and explain 
gender inequality in outcomes. From this perspective, the SIGI contributes to 
existing gender-related measures irrespective from an empirical redundancy 
perspective, meaning whether it provides additional empirical information as 
compared to other measures.Nevertheless, one can also check whether the index is 
empirically redundant with an empirical analysis of the statistical association 
between the SIGI and other well-known gender-related indices. Relying on Mark 
McGillivray and Howard White (1993), we use a correlation coefficient of 0.80 in 
absolute value as the threshold to separate redundancy from non-redundancy. 
We also calculate Kendall tau-b as a measure of rank correlation between the 
SIGI and each of the following indices: the Gender-related Development Index 
(GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) from UNDP (2006), the 
Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) from Ricardo Hausmann, Laura Tyson, Saadia 
Zahidi, and Klaus Schwab (2007), and the CIRI Women's Social Rights Index.xix As 
the GDI and the GEM have been criticized in the literature (for exampleStephan 
Klasen[2006]; Dana Schüler[2006]), we also do the analysis for two alternative 
measures, the Gender Gap Index Capped (GGI) and a revised Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM revised) based on income shares proposed by Stephan Klasen and 
Dana Schüler (2011).xx For all the indices considered Kendall tau-b is lower than 
0.60 in absolute value and statistically significant (Table 5); and rankings differ 
substantially (see Table 6).xxi Clearly, the SIGI is related to these gender inequality 
measures but is non-redundant. This suggests that the SIGI conceptually reflects a 
different approach to measuring gender inequality,and it also empirically captures 
different aspects as currently available measures. Interestingly, the highest 
correlation in absolute value (around 0.50) is found between the SIGI and the GDI 
and GGI (capped) with both measures combining health, education, and income (or 
labor force participation). The lowest correlation (around 0.43) is observed for the 
two empowerment measures GEM and GEM (revised). The results for GGG and 
WOSOC are inbetween (around 0.48).xxii Similar results regarding correlations of the 
SIGI with other gender indices are reported by van Staveren (2011). She finds that 
the SIGI is actually least correlated when studying the correlations of the SIGI, 
UNDP's new GII, the GGG, and the Gender Equity Index based on the ISD database, 
with the Pearson correlation coefficients of the SIGI running from 0.64 to 0.77. 
 Summarizing these correlations, it is clear that the SIGI is related to outcome-
based measures, but this correlation is far from perfect. This is what we would 
expect. Clearly, gender inequality in social institutions should be an important driver 
of gender inequality in outcomes; but we would not expect a perfect match. We 
therefore now turn to investigate to what extent the SIGI and its components can 
indeed be seen as a driver of gender inequality outcomes.xxiii 
 
Regression analysis 
As an illustration of the usefulness of the SIGI for empirical assessments 
ofdevelopment, we explore whether the SIGI is associated with gender inequality in 
development outcomes controlling for other factors. In particular, we run linear 
regressions with two well-known measures as dependent variables and the SIGI as 
regressor. We choose the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) as the first response 
variable because it is an encompassing measure to reflect gaps in outcome variables 
related to basic rights such as health, economic participation, and political 
empowerment. The second response variable is the ratio of GDI to HDI as a 
composite measure of gender inequality in the dimensions health, education, and 
income. As the GDI is not really a measure of gender inequalitybut a measure of 
human development that penalizesfor gender inequality, UNDP recommends using 
the ratio of GDI to HDI as a proxy for gender inequality.xxivAdditionally, we also use 
the ratio of the female to male HDI as calculated byKlasen (2006) as another 
measure of gender gaps in development outcomes. In all three regressions, we 
control for the level of economic development using the log of per capita GDP in 
constant prices (US$, PPP, base year: 2005;World Bank 2008); for religion using a 
Muslim majority and a Christian majority dummy, the left-out category being 
countries that have neither a majority of Muslim nor a majority of Christian 
population (Central Intelligence Agency 2009); and for geography and other 
unexplained heterogeneity that might go together with region using region dummies, 
the left-out category being Sub-Saharan Africa.xxv 
The regression results are presented in Table 7. With GGG as a dependent 
variable, the SIGI is negatively associated with GGG and significant at the 1 percent 
level. The second regression with the ratio of GDI to HDI as dependent variable, 
shows that the SIGI is again negatively associated with the response variable and this 
association is statistically significant at the 1 percent level; the same is true when 
using the ratio of the female to male HDI where the SIGI has a strong and highly 
significant negative impact, confirming again that gender inequality in well-being 
and empowerment is strongly associated with social institutions that shape gender 
roles.xxvi To check that our findings are not driven by observations that have large 
residuals and/or high leverage, we also run a range of robustness checks obtaining 
similar results.xxvii 
While these regressions document a significant correlation, one should 
certainly be careful with any statement about causality as there could be omitted 
variables, , measurement error and reverse causality  (Jeffrey Wooldridge 2002). We 
include control variables in the regressions with the objective to minimize omitted 
variable bias, but it is not possible to rule out this problem; as the institutions we 
capture tend to be long-lasting, we also believe that reverse causality is rather 
unlikely.  
In addition, we submit that the SIGI might be a useful measure to tackle 
endogeneity in other types of regressions. For example, in regressions examining the 
impact of gender gaps in education or health on economic growth or other 
development outcomes, endogeneity is likely to be an issue. To the extent that the 
SIGI is able to explain these gender gaps and is not directly related to growth or the 
development outcome examined, it would be a plausible instrument to tackle 
endogeneity issues in such types of analyses. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we present a composite index that approaches gender inequality in a 
way that has been neglected in the literature and by other gender measures that focus 
mainly on well-being and agency. Instead of measuring gender inequality in well-
being or agency outcome dimensions, the proposed measures proxy the underlying 
social institutions that are mirrored by societal practices and legal norms that might 
produce inequalities between women and men in developing countries. We construct 
five subindices each capturing one dimension of social institutions related to gender 
inequality that we combine into the SIGI, a multidimensional index of deprivation of 
women caused by social institutions related to gender inequality. The aggregation 
procedure used for the SIGI has the advantage of penalizing high inequality in each 
dimension and only allowing for partial compensation among the five dimensions. At 
the same time, the SIGI is easy to understand and to communicate. The SIGI’s 
composite measures allow for comparison and ranking of the deprivation of women 
in over 100 developing countries. 
Empirical results show that the SIGI is statistically non-redundant and adds 
new information to other well-known gender-related measures. The SIGI and the five 
subindices can help policymakers to detect the problems that need to be addressed in 
certain developing countries and in specific dimensions of social institutions. The 
SIGI suggests that, regions with highest inequality are South Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Middle East and North Africa. The composite measures can be valuable 
instruments to generate public discussion. Moreover, the SIGI and its subindices 
have the potential to influence current development thinking as they highlight social 
institutions that affect overall development. As it is shown in the literature (World 
Bank 2011;Stephen Knowles, Paula Lorgelly and P. Dorian Owen 2002;Stephan 
Klasen2002;Klasen and Lamanna 2009) gender inequality in education and 
employment negatively affects overall development. Economic research 
investigating these outcome inequalities should consider social institutions related to 
gender inequality as possible explanatory factors. Results from regression analysis 
show that the SIGI is related to gender inequality in well-being and empowerment, 
even after controlling for region, religion, and the level of economic development. 
When constructing composite indices, one is always confronted with 
decisions and trade-offs concerning the choice and treatment of the variables 
included, the weighting scheme, and the aggregation method. Some limitations of the 
subindices and the SIGI must be noted. First, a composite index depends on the 
quality of the data used as input. Social institutions related to gender inequality are 
hard to measure and the creation of the OECD Development Center’s GID database 
containing several indicators on social institutions is an important step forward 
(Morrisson and Jütting2005;Jütting et al.2008). It is worthwhile to continue this 
endeavor and invest more resources in the measurement of social institutions related 
to gender inequality. This includes improving data coverage, coding schemes, and 
the expansion of and refinement of indicators. It would also be useful to exploit 
prevalence and perception data available, for example, the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) capture women's perceptions on domestic violence. Similarly, more 
comparable data on fertility preferences, or social institutions involving labor 
markets would be useful. In some cases, extensions or even new data gathering 
exercises will be required. 
Second, by aggregating variables and subindices, some information is 
inevitably lost. Figures and rankings according to the SIGI and the subindices should 
not substitute a careful investigation of the variables from the database. Furthermore, 
to understand the situation in a given country additional qualitative information 
could be valuable. Detailed information on each country is available in OECD 
(2010), which includes a country discussion on the five dimensions of the SIGI.  
Third, the SIGI only measures institutions at the country level. For some 
dimensions, the use of micro data could be useful to generate more disaggregated 
version of the SIGI; here again, the DHS or other cross-country comparable micro 
data sets (such as UNICEF's MICS, the World Values Survey, or Gallup World Poll 
data) would be useful sources.xxviii 
Fourth, the omission of OECD countries remains a problem of the measure. 
While an inclusion in the current formulation of the SIGI is problematic for the 
reasons discussed above, creating a SIGI specifically for OECD countries or 
enhancing the indicator suite to make it more sensitive to gender issues in OECD 
countries would be desirable.  Similarly, generating data to develop indicators in 
currently unmeasured aspects of social institutions could also affect the ranking 
among developing regions.  As our sensitivity analysis with abortion rights shows, 
inclusion of an additional indicator can affect the ranking of regions.  Thus we 
caution that the good performance of some regions (including Latin America and 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia) might be partly due to the omission of indicators 
on gender gaps in social institutions there.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1:Pearson Correlation Coefficient (r) between the SIGI and the Simple Average of the 
Five Subindices 
 
 
 
r 0.9593
Number 
ofobservation
s 102
p-value 0.0000
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Rankings of Countries according to the SIGI and its Subindices 
  
 SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights 
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value 
             
Paraguay 1 0.00248 19 0.06890 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 1 0 
Croatia 2 0.00333 3 0.00811 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0 
Kazakhstan 3 0.00348 5 0.02837 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0 
Argentina 4 0.00379 13 0.04864 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0 
Costa Rica 5 0.00709 23 0.08106 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 1 0 
Russian Federation 6 0.00725 35 0.14028 1 0 9 0.12878 1 0 1 0 
Philippines 7 0.00788 8 0.04053 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 53 0.17351 
El Salvador 8 0.00826 17 0.06485 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 43 0.17151 
Ecuador 9 0.00914 24 0.08917 1 0 3 0.08757 1 0 53 0.17351 
Ukraine 10 0.00969 8 0.04053 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0 
Mauritius 11 0.00976 11 0.04458 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0 
Moldova 12 0.00980 12 0.04701 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0 
Bolivia 13 0.00983 13 0.04864 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0 
Uruguay 14 0.00992 15 0.05269 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0 
Venezuela, RB 15 0.01043 21 0.07295 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 1 0 
Thailand 16 0.01068 41 0.15649 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 1 0 
Peru 17 0.01213 15 0.05269 1 0 33 0.24059 1 0 1 0 
Colombia 18 0.01273 21 0.07295 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 43 0.17151 
Belarus 19 0.01339 4 0.02432 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0 
Hong Kong, China 20 0.01465 26 0.10380 1 0 1 0 89 0.25 1 0 
Singapore 21 0.01526 25 0.09975 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0 
            
          Continued on next page 
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 SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights 
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value 
             
Cuba 22 0.01603 28 0.11754 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0 
Macedonia, FYR 23 0.01787 39 0.15169 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0 
Brazil 24 0.01880 19 0.06890 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 1 0 
Tunisia 25 0.01906 32 0.12738 1 0 9 0.12878 89 0.25 1 0 
Chile 26 0.01951 34 0.13909 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 56 0.17723 
Cambodia 27 0.02202 38 0.14433 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 1 0 
Nicaragua 28 0.02251 33 0.12970 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 43 0.17151 
Trinidad and Tobago 29 0.02288 39 0.15169 1 0 15 0.16999 89 0.25 1 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 30 0.02924 42 0.15980 1 0 48 0.29877 1 0 56 0.17723 
Viet Nam 31 0.03006 6 0.03242 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0 
Armenia 32 0.03012 7 0.03648 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0 
Georgia 33 0.03069 17 0.06485 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0 
Guatemala 34 0.03193 27 0.10538 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 43 0.17151 
Tajikistan 35 0.03262 47 0.25955 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 43 0.17151 
Honduras 36 0.03316 44 0.21610 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 1 0 
Azerbaijan 37 0.03395 37 0.14314 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0 
Lao PDR 38 0.03577 51 0.32034 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0 43 0.17151 
Mongolia 39 0.03912 30 0.12001 1 0 48 0.29877 89 0.25 43 0.17151 
Dominican Republic 40 0.03984 28 0.11754 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 58 0.34502 
Myanmar 41 0.04629 35 0.14028 1 0 60 0.38634 89 0.25 1 0 
Jamaica 42 0.04843 1 0.00405 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0 76 0.35074 
Morocco 43 0.05344 48 0.26279 1 0 9 0.12878 89 0.25 58 0.34502 
Fiji 44 0.05450 8 0.04053 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 66 0.34874 
Sri Lanka 45 0.05914 46 0.23404 98 0.30069 15 0.16999 1 0 66 0.34874 
            
          Continued on next page 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2 – continued from previous page  
 SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights 
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value 
             
Madagascar 46 0.06958 70 0.41138 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 43 0.17151 
Namibia 47 0.07502 58 0.35307 1 0 34 0.25756 89 0.25 66 0.34874 
Botswana 48 0.08102 53 0.32163 1 0 15 0.16999 1 0 79 0.52225 
South Africa 49 0.08677 73 0.42326 84 0.29808 23 0.21635 1 0 58 0.34502 
Burundi 50 0.10691 57 0.33545 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225 
Albania 51 0.10720 31 0.12288 1 0 60 0.38634 101 0.5 66 0.34874 
Senegal 52 0.11041 99 0.60250 1 0 45 0.26455 1 0 58 0.34502 
Tanzania 53 0.11244 81 0.49886 1 0 22 0.20151 1 0 79 0.52225 
Ghana 54 0.11269 61 0.36621 1 0 80 0.39575 1 0 79 0.52225 
Indonesia 55 0.12776 59 0.35405 103 0.59876 79 0.39362 1 0 1 0 
Eritrea 56 0.13645 76 0.45538 1 0 106 0.68910 1 0 1 0 
Kenya 57 0.13704 63 0.37027 1 0 46 0.28152 1 0 111 0.68473 
Cote d'Ivoire 58 0.13712 79 0.49012 1 0 85 0.43455 1 0 77 0.50650 
Syrian Arab Republic 59 0.13811 68 0.40269 98 0.30069 34 0.25756 101 0.5 66 0.34874 
Malawi 60 0.14323 60 0.36087 84 0.29808 88 0.47362 1 0 79 0.52225 
Mauritania 61 0.14970 71 0.42056 98 0.30069 103 0.60183 1 0 58 0.34502 
Swaziland 62 0.15655 86 0.52144 84 0.29808 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225 
Burkina Faso 63 0.16161 88 0.53939 1 0 104 0.63092 1 0 58 0.34502 
Bhutan 64 0.16251 43 0.20513 84 0.29808 54 0.34513 118 0.75 1 0 
Nepal 65 0.16723 62 0.36779 84 0.29808 48 0.29877 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
Rwanda 66 0.16859 56 0.32974 1 0 91 0.51512 1 0 111 0.68473 
Niger 67 0.17559 104 0.64882 1 0 99 0.52482 89 0.25 58 0.34502 
Equatorial Guinea 68 0.17597 82 0.50291 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 79 0.52225 
Gambia, The 69 0.17830 103 0.64303 1 0 102 0.59698 1 0 66 0.34874 
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Table 2 – continued from previous page  
 SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights 
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value 
             
Central African Republic 70 0.18440 92 0.55902 1 0 101 0.58029 1 0 79 0.52225 
Kuwait 71 0.18602 83 0.50523 103 0.59876 34 0.25756 101 0.5 1 0 
Zimbabwe 72 0.18700 80 0.49075 84 0.29808 59 0.36937 1 0 111 0.68473 
Uganda 73 0.18718 102 0.63697 84 0.29808 81 0.41058 1 0 79 0.52225 
Benin 74 0.18899 84 0.50633 1 0 87 0.46877 1 0 111 0.68473 
Algeria 75 0.19024 69 0.40501 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 101 0.5 43 0.17151 
Bahrain 76 0.19655 52 0.32147 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 101 0.5 66 0.34874 
Mozambique 77 0.19954 109 0.69776 84 0.29808 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225 
Togo 78 0.20252 96 0.58833 1 0 86 0.44452 1 0 111 0.68473 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79 0.20448 66 0.39038 1 0 81 0.41058 1 0 119 0.83752 
Papua New Guinea 80 0.20936 50 0.27697 1 0 60 0.38634 118 0.75 78 0.50825 
Cameroon 81 0.21651 89 0.54344 84 0.29808 90 0.48332 1 0 109 0.68175 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 0.21766 49 0.26647 98 0.30069 111 0.82273 101 0.5 1 0 
China 83 0.21786 1 0.00405 1 0 48 0.29877 122 1 1 0 
Gabon 84 0.21892 107 0.68387 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 79 0.52225 
Zambia 85 0.21939 108 0.69197 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 111 0.68473 
Nigeria 86 0.21991 71 0.42056 103 0.59876 89 0.47847 89 0.25 79 0.52225 
Liberia 87 0.22651 87 0.53470 1 0 107 0.75756 1 0 79 0.52225 
Guinea 88 0.22803 105 0.67140 1 0 105 0.64546 1 0 79 0.52225 
Ethiopia 89 0.23325 55 0.32726 1 0 109 0.77424 1 0 108 0.67801 
Bangladesh 90 0.24465 95 0.58334 103 0.59876 2 0.04121 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
Libya 91 0.26019 67 0.39285 103 0.59876 91 0.51512 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
United Arab Emirates 92 0.26575 93 0.56197 103 0.59876 100 0.53180 101 0.5 66 0.34874 
Iraq 93 0.27524 77 0.47391 103 0.59876 98 0.51997 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
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Table 2 – continued from previous page  
 SIGI Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights 
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value 
             
Pakistan 94 0.28324 64 0.37821 103 0.59876 47 0.28180 118 0.75 79 0.52225 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95 0.30436 91 0.55792 119 0.78099 91 0.51512 89 0.25 79 0.52225 
India 96 0.31811 100 0.60655 103 0.59876 15 0.16999 118 0.75 79 0.52225 
Chad 97 0.32258 111 0.79330 98 0.30069 84 0.43212 1 0 120 0.84049 
Yemen 98 0.32705 97 0.59439 119 0.78099 60 0.38634 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
Mali 99 0.33949 112 0.79735 1 0 114 0.97091 1 0 58 0.34502 
Sierra Leone 100 0.34245 98 0.60159 1 0 110 0.79849 1 0 121 0.84424 
Afghanistan 101 0.58230 110 0.71598 121 0.81777 91 0.51512 122 1 109 0.68175 
Sudan 102 0.67781 106 0.67981 122 1 111 0.82273 101 0.5 122 1 
Angola  NA 89 0.54344 1 0  NA 89 0.25 79 0.52225 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  NA  NA 1 0 34 0.25756 1 0 1 0 
Taiwan  NA  NA 1 0 3 0.08757 101 0.5 1 0 
Congo, Rep.  NA 101 0.62450 1 0  NA 1 0 79 0.52225 
Guinea-Bissau  NA  NA  NA 107 0.75756 1 0 111 0.68473 
Haiti  NA 65 0.37837 1 0 54 0.34513 1 0  NA 
Israel  NA 45 0.22712 1 0  NA 1 0 1 0 
Jordan  NA 85 0.51739 103 0.59876  NA 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  NA  NA 84 0.29808 91 0.51512 1 0 1 0 
Lebanon  NA  NA 103 0.59876 60 0.38634 1 0 53 0.17351 
Lesotho  NA 94 0.57149 84 0.29808  NA 1 0 79 0.52225 
Malaysia  NA 53 0.32163 103 0.59876  NA 1 0 1 0 
Occupied Palestinian Territory  NA 78 0.48607 103 0.59876  NA 1 0 66 0.34874 
Oman  NA 74 0.45364 84 0.29808  NA 101 0.5 66 0.34874 
Panama  NA  NA 1 0 8 0.11181 1 0 1 0 
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Table 2 – continued from previous page  
 SIGI  Family code Civil liberties Physical integrity Son preference Ownership rights 
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value Ranking Value 
             
Puerto Rico  NA  NA 1 0 23 0.21635 1 0  NA 
Saudi Arabia  NA 74 0.45364 122 1  NA 101 0.5 79 0.52225 
Serbia and Montenegro  NA  NA 1 0  NA  NA 43 0.17151 
Somalia  NA  NA 103 0.59876 113 0.84213 1 0 111 0.68473 
Timor-Leste  NA  NA 1 0 83 0.42755 89 0.25 79 0.52225 
Turkmenistan  NA  NA 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 79 0.52225 
Uzbekistan  NA  NA 1 0 60 0.38634 1 0 1 0 
             
              
Source: own calculations based on GID Database.
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regional Pattern of the SIGI and Subindices 
  
 ECA LAC EAP SA SSA MENA Total 
        
SIGI        
Quintile 1 6 10 4 0 1 0 21 
Quintile 2 6 8 5 0 0 1 20 
Quintile 3 1 1 2 1 14 2 21 
Quintile 4 0 0 1 2 13 4 20 
Quintile 5 0 0 1 4 10 5 20 
Total 13 19 13 7 38 12 102 
        
        
        
Family Code        
Quintile 1 7 11 4 0 1 0 23 
Quintile 2 5 8 6 1 0 2 22 
Quintile 3 1 1 4 3 9 5 23 
Quintile 4 0 0 0 0 15 7 22 
Quintile 5 0 0 0 3 16 3 22 
Total 13 20 14 7 41 17 112 
        
        
        
Civil Liberties        
Quintile 1, 2, 3 17 22 14 0 27 3 83 
Quintile 4 0 0 1 3 12 3 19 
Quintile 5 0 0 2 4 3 12 21 
Total 17 22 17 7 42 18 123 
        
        
        
Physical Integrity        
Quintile 1 5 13 5 3 4 2 32 
Quintile 2 4 4 1 0 3 2 14 
Quintile 3 7 5 7 3 6 4 32 
Quintile 4 0 0 3 1 13 2 19 
Quintile 5 0 0 0 0 14 3 17 
Total 16 22 16 7 40 13 114 
        
        
        
Son Preference        
Quintile 1, 2, 3 15 21 10 1 38 3 88 
Quintile 4 0 1 4 0 4 3 12 
Quintile 5 1 0 3 6 1 12 23 
Total 16 22 17 7 43 18 123 
        
        
        
Ownership Rights        
Quintile 1 12 12 11 1 2 4 42 
Quintile 2 2 4 2 0 1 1 10 
Quintile 3 2 3 2 1 8 7 23 
Quintile 4 1 1 2 4 18 6 32 
Quintile 5 0 0 0 1 14 0 15 
Total 17 20 17 7 43 18 122 
        
        
        
 
Source: own calculations.  
 
ECA stands for Europe and Central Asia, LAC for Latin America and the Caribbean, EAP for East 
Asia and Pacific, SSA for Sub-Saharan Africa, and MENA for Middle East and North Africa. 
 
Table 4:Comparison of the SIGI and the reformulated SIGI including the abortion rights  
indicator in the Subindex Physical integrity 
  
 SIGI Reformulated SIGI Reformulated SIGI Rank
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank
      
Paraguay 1 .0024832 16 .0130984 15 
Croatia 2 .00333 1 .0015562 -1 
Kazakhstan 3 .0034778 2 .001704 -1 
Argentina 4 .0037899 7 .0067192 3 
Costa Rica 5 .0070934 15 .0125667 10 
Russian Federation 6 .0072524 5 .0054786 -1 
Philippines 7 .0078831 25 .0184983 18 
El Salvador 8 .0082581 32 .0292857 24 
Ecuador 9 .0091447 13 .0120282 4 
Ukraine 10 .00969 3 .0046835 -7 
Mauritius 11 .009759 27 .0227487 16 
Moldova 12 .0098035 4 .0047971 -8 
Bolivia 13 .0098346 11 .0116548 -2 
Uruguay 14 .0099167 12 .0117369 -2 
Venezuela, RB 15 .0104259 28 .0234157 13 
Thailand 16 .010677 17 .0132887 1 
Peru 17 .0121323 22 .01708 5 
Colombia 18 .012727 18 .0136476 0 
Belarus 19 .0133856 6 .0062903 -13 
Singapore 20 .0152573 8 .008162 -12 
Cuba 21 .0160304 9 .0089351 -12 
Macedonia, FYR 22 .0178696 10 .0107743 -12 
Brazil 23 .0188021 30 .0255639 7 
Tunisia 24 .0190618 23 .017288 -1 
Chile 25 .0195128 37 .0460561 12 
Cambodia 26 .0220188 14 .0124714 -12 
Nicaragua 27 .0225149 40 .050074 13 
Trinidad and Tobago 28 .0228815 31 .0283548 3 
Kyrgyz Republic 29 .0292419 26 .0196945 -3 
Viet Nam 30 .0300619 19 .0140974 -11 
Armenia 31 .0301177 20 .0141533 -11 
Georgia 32 .0306926 21 .0147282 -11 
Guatemala 33 .0319271 34 .0437438 1 
Tajikistan 34 .0326237 29 .0255284 -5 
Honduras 35 .0331625 36 .0449791 1 
      
     Continued on next page
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – continued from previous page  
 SIGI Reformulated SIGI Reformulated SIGI Rank
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank
      
Azerbaijan 36 .0339496 24 .0179851 -12 
Lao PDR 37 .0357687 35 .0437653 -2 
Mongolia 38 .0391165 33 .029569 -5 
Dominican Republic 39 .0398379 41 .0528382 2 
Myanmar 40 .0462871 42 .0569791 2 
Jamaica 41 .0484293 39 .0500468 -2 
Morocco 42 .0534361 43 .058863 1 
Fiji 43 .0545044 38 .0494889 -5 
Sri Lanka 44 .059141 44 .0716846 0 
Madagascar 45 .0695815 46 .0802735 1 
Namibia 46 .0750237 45 .0735425 -1 
Botswana 47 .0810172 48 .0819378 1 
South Africa 48 .0867689 47 .0817624 -1 
Burundi 49 .1069056 51 .1066622 2 
Albania 50 .1071956 49 .0912312 -1 
Senegal 51 .1104056 54 .1251181 3 
Tanzania 52 .1124419 52 .1183621 0 
Ghana 53 .112694 50 .1052269 -3 
Indonesia 54 .1277609 56 .1389811 2 
Eritrea 55 .1364469 53 .1204684 -2 
Kenya 56 .1370416 57 .1429693 1 
Cote d'Ivoire 57 .1371181 58 .1497392 1 
Syrian Arab Republic 58 .1381059 59 .1511063 1 
Malawi 59 .1432271 61 .1518833 2 
Mauritania 60 .1497032 62 .155864 2 
Swaziland 61 .1565499 60 .1515344 -1 
Burkina Faso 62 .1616069 55 .1380899 -7 
Bhutan 63 .162508 66 .1679368 3 
Nepal 64 .1672252 63 .1576778 -1 
Rwanda 65 .1685859 64 .1601858 -1 
Niger 66 .1755873 69 .180021 3 
Equatorial Guinea 67 .1759719 65 .1675719 -2 
Gambia, The 68 .1782978 67 .169225 -1 
Central African Republic 69 .1843973 75 .1888697 6 
Kuwait 70 .1860213 74 .186752 4 
Zimbabwe 71 .1869958 71 .183226 0 
Uganda 72 .1871794 73 .1860078 1 
Benin 73 .1889945 68 .1760802 -5 
Algeria 74 .190244 76 .1900006 2 
      
     Continued on next page
      
Table 4 – continued from previous page  
 SIGI Reformulated SIGI Reformulated SIGI Rank
Country Ranking Value Ranking Value minus SIGI rank 
      
Bahrain 75 .1965476 70 .1805831 -5 
Mozambique 76 .1995442 78 .1993008 2 
Togo 77 .202518 79 .1998853 2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 78 .2044817 85 .2147335 7 
Papua New Guinea 79 .2093579 83 .2091145 4 
Cameroon 80 .2165121 81 .2062414 1 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 81 .2176608 80 .2056881 -1 
China 82 .2178559 82 .2083084 0 
Gabon 83 .2189224 88 .2237584 5 
Zambia 84 .2193876 84 .2113943 0 
Nigeria 85 .2199123 87 .2156295 2 
Liberia 86 .2265095 72 .1848595 -14 
Guinea 87 .2280293 86 .2154953 -1 
Ethiopia 88 .2332508 77 .1923895 -11 
Bangladesh 89 .2446482 89 .25354 0 
Libya 90 .260187 90 .265023 0 
United Arab Emirates 91 .2657521 91 .2723574 0 
Iraq 92 .2752427 92 .2798794 0 
Pakistan 93 .2832434 93 .2872753 0 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 94 .3043608 95 .3091968 1 
India 95 .318112 97 .3181828 2 
Chad 96 .3225771 98 .3223899 2 
Yemen 97 .3270495 99 .3377415 2 
Mali 98 .339493 94 .2949676 -4 
Sierra Leone 99 .3424468 96 .3133231 -3 
Afghanistan 100 .5823044 100 .5871404 0 
Sudan 101 .6778067 101 .653676 0 
      
      
 
The data are sorted according to the value of the SIGI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:Comparison with other Gender-related Indices 
Statistical Association between the SIGI and other Gender-related Measures 
 
 
 Kendall tau-b p-value Number obs. 
 
     
 
-0.501 0.000 79 
 
GDI 
 
GGI (capped) -0.509 0.000 85 
 
GEM -0.425 0.001 33 
 
GEM (revised) -0.440 0.000 33 
 
GGG -0.474 0.000 73 
 
WOSOC -0.486 0.000 99 
 
     
     
 
 
 
Data for the Gender-related development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) are 
from  United Nations Development Programme (2006) and are based on the year 2004. The Gender Gap 
Index (GGI) capped and the revised Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM revised) are taken from  
Klasen and Schüler(2009)based on the year 2004. Data for the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) are 
fromHausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi(2007). The Women's Social Rights Index (WOSOC) data correspond 
to the year 2007 andare obtained from http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. The p-values correspond to the null 
hypothesis that the SIGI and the corresponding measure are independent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:Comparison of Ranks: the SIGI and other Gender-related Indices 
 
 
Country SIGI GDI GGI GEM GEM GGG WOSOC
 
   
(capped)
 
(revised)
   
      
 
         
Paraguay 1     32 19
 
Croatia 2 6 16 6 7 3 19
 
Kazakhstan 3 18 1  10 19
 
Argentina 4 2 21 2 3 11 3
 
Costa Rica 5 7 40 3 2 8 3
 
Russian Federation 6 10 6 22 22 18 19
 
Philippines 7 22 30 10 8 1 19
 
El Salvador 8 29 35 13 14 20 19
 
Ecuador 9   14 11 17 19
 
Ukraine 10 19 7 23 23 25 19
 
Mauritius 11 12 46  44 3
 
Moldova 12       
 
Bolivia 13 35 24 19 15 41 3
 
Uruguay 14 5 17 15 17 39 19
 
Venezuela, RB 15 17 23 11 13 24 
 
Thailand 16 16 8 20 18 22 19
 
Peru 17 23 24 8 6 37 3
 
Colombia 18 15 11 16 16 7 3
 
Belarus 19 11 3  6 3
 
Hong Kong, China 20       
 
Singapore 21   1 11 38 19
 
Cuba 22  37  5 1
 
Macedonia, FYR 23 13 32 9 9 13 19
 
Brazil 24 14 20 20 19 36 3
 
Tunisia 25 26 72  55 64
 
Chile 26 3 44 16 20 45 3
 
Cambodia 27 45 10 28 26 52 3
 
Nicaragua 28 37 56  49 19
 
Trinidad and Tobago 29 9 33 4 5 19 1
 
Kyrgyz Republic 30 34 11  33 19
 
Viet Nam 31 31 2  15 19
 
Armenia 32 20 4  34 19
 
Georgia 33   24 24 30 19
 
Guatemala 34 39 64  58 19
 
Tajikistan 35 40 19  40 19
 
Honduras 36 38 36 12 10 31 19
 
          
Continued on next page 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – continued from previous page  
Country SIGI GDI GGI GEM GEM GGG WOSOC
   (capped)  (revised)   
        
Azerbaijan 37 28 4  26 19
Lao PDR 38 47 45   3
Mongolia 39 36 27 25 25 27 3
Dominican Republic 40 25 38  29 19
Myanmar 41 14   64
Jamaica 42 30 18  14 3
Morocco 43     19
Fiji 44     3
Sri Lanka 45 24 51 29 28 2 19
Madagascar 46 53 15  48 19
Namibia 47 43 33 5 4 9 19
Botswana 48 46 59 18 21 23 64
South Africa 49 41 42  4 19
Burundi 50 72 24   64
Albania 51     19
Senegal 52     64
Tanzania 53 66 27 7 1 12 19
Ghana 54 48 27  28 19
Indonesia 55 32 39  42 19
Eritrea 56     19
Kenya 57 57 42  43 64
Cote d'Ivoire 58 68 80   64
Syrian Arab Republic 59 33 63  56 64
Malawi 60 70 41  46 19
Mauritania 61 60 48  60 64
Swaziland 62 59 82   64
Burkina Faso 63 76 50  66 64
Bhutan 64     3
Nepal 65 51 61  70 64
Rwanda 66 63 9   3
Niger 67 79 78   19
Equatorial Guinea 68 42 62   19
Gambia, The 69    50 19
Central African Republic 70 75 67   19
Kuwait 71 1 48  51 64
Zimbabwe 72 58 57  47 19
Uganda 73 54 31  21 19
Benin 74 67 73  69 64
Algeria 75     64
      
  Continued on next page    
        
Table 6 – continued from previous page  
Country SIGI GDI GGI GEM GEM GGG WOSOC
 
   (capped)  (revised)   
 
         
Bahrain 76 4 76  64 64
 
Mozambique 77 71 47  16 64
 
Togo 78 61 70   64
 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 79 73 60   64
 
Papua New Guinea 80 50 22   19
 
Cameroon 81 55 54  65 64
 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82   32 31 68 64
 
China 83 20 13  35 64
 
Gabon 84      64
 
Zambia 85 69 64  54 64
 
Nigeria 86 64 66  59 64
 
Liberia 87  68   19
 
Guinea 88 65 58   19
 
Ethiopia 89     62 64
 
Bangladesh 90 49 52 27 27 53 64
 
Libya 91  69   64
 
United Arab Emirates 92 8 74 30 32 57 64
 
Iraq 93  84   64
 
Pakistan 94 51 81 26 28 71 64
 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 95 27 54 31 30 67 64
 
India 96 44 77  63 19
 
Chad 97 74 75  72 64
 
Yemen 98 62 83 33 33 73 64
 
Mali 99 77 53  61 19
 
Sierra Leone 100 78 71   64
 
Afghanistan 101  85   19
 
Sudan 102 56 79   64
 
         
         
 
102 79 85 33 33 73 99
 
Number of obs. 
 
         
         
         
 
 
 
Data for the Gender-related development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) are 
from UNDP (2006) and are based on the year 2004. The Gender Gap Index (GGI) capped and the revised 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM revised) are taken from  Klasen and Schüler(2009)based on the 
year 2004. Data for the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) are from Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi(2007). 
The Women's Social Rights Index (WOSOC) data correspond to the year 2007and are obtained from 
http://ciri.binghamton.edu/. 
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RESULTS FROM REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
Table 7: Linear Regressions with Dependent Variables GGG, Ratio of GDI to HDI, and Ratio 
of female to male HDI 
 
 GGG Ratio of Ratio of 
 
  GDI to HDI female to 
 
   male HDI 
 
 coef/se coef/se coef/se 
 
     
     
 
-0.282*** -0.053*** -0.212** 
 
SIGI 
 
 (0.090) (0.017) (0.084) 
 
Log GDP 0.014* 0.004 0.045*** 
 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
 
SA -0.006 -0.001 0.006 
 
 (0.032) (0.008) (0.025) 
 
ECA -0.012 0.007 0.110*** 
 
 (0.018) (0.005) (0.019) 
 
LAC -0.040** -0.000 0.052*** 
 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.018) 
 
MENA -0.044 0.000 0.010 
 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.028) 
 
EAP 0.004 0.009** 0.069*** 
 
 (0.023) (0.005) (0.018) 
 
Muslim -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 
 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.018) 
 
Christian 0.026 0.002 0.007 
 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) 
 
constant 0.567*** 0.959*** 0.503*** 
 
 (0.064) (0.020) (0.070) 
 
     
     
 
72 78 78 
 
Number of obs. 
 
Adjusted R2 0.615 0.431 0.785 
 
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
      
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
HC robust standard errors in brackets. 
 
Data for the Global Gender Gap Index (GGG) are from Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi(2007). Data for the 
Human Development Index (HDI) and for Gender-related Development Index (GDI) are from 
UNDP(2006)and are based on the year 2004. The ratio of the female to male HDI is the one calculated by 
Klasen (2006) based on the year 2004. 
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iSee http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/(accessed July 2013)for information on the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
iiFor a detailed review of these and other measures, see Irene van Staveren (2011); A Geske 
Dijkstra (2006) and Stephan Klasen and Dana Schüler (2011). 
iiiInformation is available on the webpage of the project http://ciri.binghamton.edu/ (date of access: 
April 16, 2010).  
iv Please note that this paper discusses variables and aggregation procedure the the 2009 formulation 
of the SIGI.  In 2012, a new version of the SIGI was presented by the OECD Development Center 
which uses a very similar coding and aggregation procedure but slightly different variables that also 
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tend to refer to a later perios. For more innovations see http://www.genderindex.org/data (accessed 
July 2013) 
For further analyses that use the SIGI or its subindices as explanatory or as dependent variables, see 
Boris Branisa, Stephan Klasen, and Maria Ziegler (2013);Boris Branisa and Maria Ziegler 
(2010);Johannes Jütting, Angela Luci, and Christian Morrisson (2012); Niklas Potrafke and 
Heinrich Ursprung (2011);Seo-Young Cho (2010);Nicola Jones, Caroline Harper, and Carol 
Watson (2010).  
viSee Stephan Klasen (2007) for a discussion. 
vii The data are available at the web-pages supported by OECD Development Centre 
http://www.wikigender.organd http://www. oecd.org/dev/gender/gid(accessedApril 16 2010). 
viiiTwo of the variables (early marriage and female genital mutilation) are continuous. The other 
indicators measure social institutions on an ordinal categorical scale. 
ixUsual Principal component analysis (PCA) is only valid for normally distributed variables (Ian 
Jolliffe 1986). This assumption is violated in this case, as the data include variables that are 
ordinal, and hence the Pearson correlation coefficient used for PCA is not appropriate. Following 
Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) we use polychoric PCA, which relies on polychoric and polyserial 
correlations. These correlations are estimated with maximum likelihood, assuming that there are 
latent normally distributed variables that underlie the ordinal categorical data. 
xThe first principal component is the weighted sum of the standardized original variables that 
captures as much of the variance in the data as possible. The proportion of explained variance by 
the first principal component is 70 percent for Family code, 93 percent for Civil liberties, 60 
percent for Physical integrity and 87 percent for Ownership rights. The standardization of the 
original variables is done as follows: In the case of continuous variables, one subtracts the mean 
and then divides by the standard deviation. In the case of ordinal categorical variables, the 
standardization uses results of an ordered probit model. 
xiAcceptance of polygamy in the population might proxy actual practices better than the formal 
indicator legality of polygamy and, moreover, laws might be changed faster than practices. 
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Therefore, the acceptance variable is the first choice for the subindex Family code. The reason for 
using legality when acceptance is missing is to increase the number of countries included. 
xiiOriginally, missing women was part of the dimension Physical integrity, but we argue that missing 
women reflects another dimension of gender inequality. The two components of Physical integrity, 
violenceagainst women and female genital mutilation, focus on freedom from bodily harm, while 
missing womenis a more general proxy for Son preference that results in skewed fertility strategies 
and allocation decisions favoring sons. It also turns out that the statistical association between the 
two indicators of Physical integrityand Son preferenceis rather weak, suggesting that it is 
measuring a different concept 
xiiiNotethat these indicators are based on legal rights, not actual prevalence. See Cheryl Doss, Caren 
Grown, and Carmen Deere (2008) for a careful discussion of how to generate micro-based 
indicators of asset ownership by gender. 
xivSome differences between the SIGI and the FGT measures must be highlighted. In the case of the 
SIGI, we are aggregating across dimensions and not over individuals. Moreover, in contrast to the 
income case, a lower value of xi is preferred, and the normalization achieved when dividing by the 
poverty line z is not necessary as 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, i = 1, ... , n.  
xvThesubindices are computed only for countries that have no missing values on the relevant input 
variables. In the case of the SIGI only countries that have values for every sub-index are 
considered. 
xviMost of the results we report here can be deduced from the Tables with the country rankings. We 
did not report separate tables for this analysis but they are available on request. 
xviiThe only exception here is that in the Middle East and North Africa where inheritance rights 
uniformly score a 0.5. 
xviiiMoreover, from a statistical point of view, the rank correlation coefficient Kendall Tau-b between 
the other variable in the sub-index, namely freedom of movement, and Civil liberties as it is defined 
here is close to 0.9. This suggests that excluding the variable freedom of dress, and having freedom 
of movement as the only variable capturing the freedom of social participation of women would not 
lead to a major change in the ranking of countries according to this sub-index. 
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xixData obtained fromCIRI Human Rights Data Project, seehttp://ciri.binghamton.edu/, accessed 
April 2010. 
xxThe GGI is a geometric mean of the ratios of female to male achievements in the dimensions 
health, education and labor force participation. Capped means that every component is capped at 
one before calculating the geometric mean. This is done to ensure that that only gaps hurting 
women are considered. GGI can be more directly interpreted as a measure of gender inequality 
while the GDI measures human development penalizing gender inequality. The GEM has three 
components, political representation, representation in senior positions in the economy, and power 
over economic re-sources. The most problematic component is power over economic resources 
proxied by earned incomes. This component measures female and male earned incomes using 
income levels adjusted by gender gaps; it is empirically largely driven by income levels, not 
gender gaps. To avoid this problem the revised GEM only uses income shares of males and 
females in this component. 
xxiWe have also computed the Pearson correlation coefficient between SIGI and all the measures. 
The Pearson correlation coefficient is lower than 0.80 for all correlations. 
xxiiIt must be noted that the samples used for computing the rank correlation are different from case 
to case ranging from 33 countries (GEM) to 99 (WOSOC). 
xxiiiSee Branisa, Klasen, and Ziegler (2013);Branisa and Ziegler (2010) for more detailed 
assessments of the empirical relevance of the SIGI and its subindices in explaining development 
outcomes. 
xxivSee UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/gdi_gem/ (accessed April 2010).  
xxvAs the number of observations is lower than 100, we use HC3 robust standard errors proposed by 
Russell Davidson and James MacKinnon (1993) to account for possible heteroscedasticity in our 
data. 
xxviUsing the difference between the HDI and the GDI, another possible measure of gender 
inequality, the impact of the SIGI is similarly significant. 
xxviiResults are available upon request. The type of robust regression we perform uses iteratively 
reweighted least squares and is described in Lawrence Hamilton (1992). A regression is run with 
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ordinary least squares, then case weights based on absolute residuals are calculated, and a new 
regression is performed using these weights. The iterations continue as long as the maximum change 
in weights remains above a specified value. 
xxviiiSee Doss, Grown, and Deere (2008) for suggestions regarding developing micro data on gender 
inequality in asset holdings. 
